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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DEATH PENALTY
FOR NON-AGGRAVATED RAPE
Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970)
The appellant, armed with a tire iron, broke into the victim's home
late at night. Threatening to kill her and her young son if she did
not submit, he committed rape. A physician who examined the vic-
tim testified that she had suffered no physical or psychological harm
from the appellant's assault. The appellant confessed to the crime, was
convicted of rape, and sentenced to death by a three-judge court
sitting without a jury.' He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus con-
tending that, in a rape case, when the victim's life is neither taken
nor endangered, the imposition of the death penalty constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment. The writ was denied.2  On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held: although
the sentence imposed by the trial court was within Maryland's statutory
prescription for rape, the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment prohibits the execution of a rapist whose vic-
tim's life was neither taken nor endangered.'
1. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461 (Repl. Vol. 1967) provides:
Every person convicted of a crime of rape or as being an accessory thereto
before the fact shall, at the discretion of the court, suffer death, or be sen-
tenced to confinement in the penitentiary for the period of his natural life,
or undergo a confinement in the penitentiary for not less than eighteen
months nor more than twenty-one years ...
2. The record does not indicate that the eighth amendment issue was ever raised
in the state courts. Nevertheless, the attorney for the state did not urge dismissal for
lack of exhaustion of state remedies. The state courts of Maryland have repeatedly
held that punishment is not cruel and unusual if it is within the statutory limits pro-
scribed for the crime. See Robinson v. State, 238 A.2d 875 (1968). The appellate
court found that the appellant had satisfied the exhaustion of state remedies require-
ment of federal law, since proceeding in the state court would have been ineffective.
Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 788 n.1 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. filed, June 1, 1971.
3. Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 787 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. filed, June 1, 1971.
This was exactly the same question before the Supreme Court in Rudolph v. State,
275 Ala. 115, 52 So. 2d 662 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg,
Douglas, and Brennan dissenting). In 1964 the Fourth Circuit had refused to rule on
the same issue, stating that they had found no Supreme Court decision to support
Ralph's eighth amendment contention and were not disposed to act favorably upon it.
Ralph v. Pepersack, 335 F.2d 128, 141 (1964).
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The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be re-
quired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment
inflicted."'4  Originally the courts interpreted the words "cruel and un-
usual" to mean the cruelty inherent in certain forms and methods of
punishment.5 The Supreme Court broadened this interpretation in
Weems v. United States.8 Weems, a government worker in the Phili-
pines, was convicted of falsifying a minor government document. In
accordance with the Spanish Penal Code then in effect, Weems was
sentenced to fifteen years at hard labor with a life-long denial of civil
rights.7 The Court found the punishment disproportionate to the
crime8 and declared the entire statutory scheme unconstitutional.9 This
decision was justified not only on the historical ground that the
drafters of the eighth amendment intended the clause to reach more
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Every state constitution, with the exception of Con-
necticut (where the provision is statutory) and Vermont (where it is considered to
be part of the common law) has a similar provision. D. FELLMAN, THE DEFENDANT'S
RiGrHTs 203 (1958). For this reason there has been little debate whether cruel and
unusual punishment is a state or federal constitutional issue. It is now settled,
however, that the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment is
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (1962). See note 11 infra.
5. It was not until 1878 that the Supreme Court, in Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S.
130 (1878), had occasion to discuss at length the constitutional prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment. In upholding shooting as a mode of execution, the
court noted the difficulty in defining "the extent of the constitutional provision" but
stated its applicability to "punishments of torture . . . and all others [involving]
necessary cruelty." Id. at 136. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890).
"Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punish-
ment of death is not cruel within the meaning of that word in the constitution. It
implies something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinction
of life." Cf. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463-64 (1947).
6. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). The Court was interpreting the Phillipine bill of
rights prohibiting the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. The language of
this provision was identical to the eighth amendment, and the Court found that Con-
gress, in drafting the Phillipine provision, intended to give the words their constitutional
significance. Id. at 383 (dissenting opinion).
7. Id. at 357-58.
8. "[Ilt is a precept of justice that punishment for a crime should be graduated
and proportioned to the offense." Id. at 367. The basis for this interpretation of the
eighth amendment had been laid in O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 337 (1892), by
Mr. Justice Field, dissenting. He said the eighth amendment was "directed. . . against
all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportionate
to the offenses charged." Id. at 339-40.
9. The court declared that the punishment would have been unconstitutionally
disproportionate even if Weems had been given the minimum sentence of twelve years
at hard labor. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 365 (1910).
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than methods of punishment,' 0 but also by the judgment that the amend-
ment should be interpreted in light of the changing times."
The Weems doctrine of proportionality has seldom been used to in-
validate harsh sentences because the majority of courts interpret the
eighth amendment and similar state provisions as directed only to
legislative action. Under that view a sentence imposed within the
limits of a valid statute cannot be cruel and unusual.' In these jur-
isdictions a statutory punishment may be constitutionally attacked only
on the grounds that it is so severe it would be cruel and unusual under
any circumstances. This judicial deference to legislative judgment
may be explained by the lack of definite guidelines to determine what
is cruel and unusual.'3 A minority of courts have, however, ruled
sentences imposed within valid statutes unconstitutional,' 4 finding the
eighth amendment a limitation on judicial as well as legislative action.
Recognizing that fixing penalties is unquestionably a legislative func-
10. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
11. Id. at 378. "The clause of the Constitution . . . is not fastened to the obsolete,
but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice."
The Court further broadened its interpretation of the eighth amendment in Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), invalidating punishment of imprisonment imposed
for narcotics addiction. Analogizing narcotics addiction to mental illness and leprosy,
the Court concluded that "in light of contemporary human knowledge, a law which
made a criminal offense of such disease would doubtless be universally thought to be
an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments." Id. at 666.
12. See, e.g., United States v. MacLeod, 436 F.2d 947, 951 (8th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, - U.S. - (1971); Guerro v. Fitzpatrick, 436 F.2d 378, 380 (1st Cir. 1971);
United States v. Dawson, 400 F.2d 194, 200 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1023 (1969); Overstreet v. United States, 367 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1966); Lindsay v.
United States, 332 F.2d 688, 692 (9th Cir. 1964); Beckett v. United States, 84 F.2d
731, 733 (6th Cir. 1936); Schultz v. Zerbst, 73 F.2d 668, 670 (10th Cir. 1934);
Crossin v. State, 244 So. 2d 142, 144 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); People v. Sinclair,
30 Mich. App. 473, 477, 186 N.W.2d 767, 771 (1971); State v. Grimm, 461 S.W.2d
746, 759 (Mo. 1971).
13. Cf. Goldberg, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REv.
1773, 1777 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Goldberg]; Note, Revival of the Eighth
Amendment: Development of Cruel-Unusual Punishment Doctrine by the Supreme
Court, 16 STAN. L Rsv. 996 (1964).
14. See, e.g., Hedrick v. United States, 357 F.2d 121, 124 (10th Cir. 1966) (dic-
tum); Rudolph v. Alabama, 275 Ala. 115, 52 So. 2d 662 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
889 (1963) (Goldberg, Douglas and Brennan dissenting); United States v. Rosenberg,
195 F.2d 583, 608 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952); United States
ex rel. Bongioro v. Ragen, 54 F. Supp. 973, 980 (N.D. Ill. 1945), aff'd, 146 F.2d
349 (7th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 865 (1945); Faulkner v. State, 445 P.2d 815
(Alas. 1968); Stephens v. State, 73 Okla. Crim. 349, 354, 121 P.2d 326, 328 (1942);
Calhoun v. State, 85 Tex. Crim. 496, 504, 214 S.W. 335, 338 (1919).
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tion, these courts have suggested that under some circumstances a
sentence may be disproportionate to the crime. Implicit in these
decisions is the belief that the appellate court is the final guardian of
the rights of the individual.
Thirty-four states do not punish rape by death under any circum-
stances.Y5 In the other sixteen states, death is an alternative but
not mandatory punishment for rape.' 6 The Maryland legislature has
enacted penalties for rape ranging from eighteen months imprisonment
to death.'7  Finding the eighth amendment a limitation on judicial
as well as legislative action, 8 the court in Ralph v. Warden was faced
with the constitutionality of the trial court's selection of the death pen-
alty from among the statutory alternatives. It did not attempt to de-
cide whether capital punishment per se violates the eight amendment,
but decided the narrower question whether capital punishment for
rape when the victim's life had neither been taken nor endangered is
so disproportionate to the crime as to be cruel and unusual. Relying
on language in Weems' 9 and Trop v. Dulles,20 the court concluded
15. ALAS. STAT. §11.15.130 (1970); Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-614 (1971);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 264 (Deering 1971); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-28 (1963);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 781 (1970); HIAwMI REv. Lkws § 768-61 (1968); IDAHO
CODE ANN. ch. 61 § 18-6104 (1947); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-1 (1963); IND.
ANN. STAT. § 10-4201 (1956); IOWA CODE ANN. § 698.1 (1946); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-3502 (1971); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 3151 (1964); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 265, § 22 (1968); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.355 (1962); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.01
(1964); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 94-4104 (1969); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-408 (1965);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 585-16 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:164-3 (1968); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 40A-1-7; § 40A-9-2 (1964); N.Y. PENAL LAw art. 130 § 25, 30, 35
(McKinney 1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-30-05 (1960); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2901.24 (Page 1954); ORE. REV. STAT. § 163.210 (1969); PA. STAT. tit. 18,
§ 4721 (1963); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 11-37-1 (1970); S.D. CRM. CODE § 22-22-5
(1967); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-53-18 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3201 (1958);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.79.020 (1961); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-15 (1966);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 944.01 (1958); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-63 (1959).
16. ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 395 (1959); ARx. STAT. ANN. § 41-3403 (1964);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.01 (1965); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2001 (1969); KY. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 435.090 (1971); LA. CIvIL CODE art. 14.42 (West 1951); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 461 (1971); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2358 (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 559.260 (1953); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.363 (1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-21
(1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1115 (1970); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-72 (1962);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3702 (1955); TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1189 (1961); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.1-44 (1960).
17. See note 1 supra.
18. Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 789-91 (4th Cir. 1970).
19. See note 11 supra.
20. "The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of de-
cency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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that- current public opinion provided the appropriate standard to de-
termine whether the death sentence for appellant's crime was cruel
and unusual punishment."' For objective indicia of public opinion the
court looked to legislative schemes in other states and nations, and
the general decline in executions for rape.22 Neither basis for this
determination is a scientifically reliable indication of public sentiment.
The Ralph court found that the absence of the death penalty in
thirty-four states was a strong indication of public sentiment.2 3 In
Weems, the Supreme Court had used a comparative law approach, but
no American jurisdiction had a punishment for a comparable crime
even approaching the severity of Weem's sentence. When, as in Ralph,
almost one-third of the jurisdictions have similar statutory provisions,
the contrast may show no more than different exercises of legislative
judgment, and not strong sentiment against the death sentence. The
court was also on uncertain ground in concluding that the legislative
schemes reveal current trends. In 1919, only seventeen states pro-
vided the death penalty for rape compared to sixteen today.2 4  The
court was apparently impressed by recent but unsuccessful attempts
to abolish the death penalty for rape. Indeed, the infrequency with
which the death penalty has been imposed in rape cases may have
diminished public awareness of this issue and placed a damper on any
movement for statutory change.20
21. Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 789-90 (4th Cir. 1970). For other Supreme
Court cases supporting this conclusion, see Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666
(1962); Louisiana ex. rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 471 (1947).
22. Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 791-93 (4th Cir. 1970).
23. Id. See note 18 supra.
24. In 1919 seventeen states provided the death penalty for rape. BYE, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 11-12 (1919); Packer, Making the Punishment Fit
the Crime, 77 I-HAv. L. REv. 1071, 1073 (1964).
25. Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 791 (4th Cir. 1970). The court reasoned that
the elimination of the death penalty for rape in the District of Columbia, D.C. Court
Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91, 358, § 20, 84 Stat. 473,
600, amending D.C. CODE ANr-. § 22-2801 (1970), was symbolic of the total move-
ment. Also, the recommendations of the National Commission on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws, Study Draft of a New Federal Criminal Code, §§ 1641 and 3201
(1971), and the N.J. MODEL PENAL CODE, §§ 213.1 and 6.06 (Proposed Official
Draft, 1962) carried considerable weight. Such activity, although from highly re-
spected sources, is hardly indicative of any large-scale trend.
26. Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 792 (4th Cir. 1970). For example, only once
in the last forty years has the Federal Government executed anyone for rape, United
States Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, National Prisoner Statistics, No. 45, Capital
Punishment 1930-1968, at 29 (1969). See note 35 infra.
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The actual decline in the number of executions for rape does not, of
course, necessarily reflect current public opinion. Although no one has
been executed for any crime in the United States since 196727 and no
one for rape since 1964, -8 the number of persons sentenced to death
has steadily increased.2" Unless there has been a wide divergence beween
the judges and juries who impose the sentence and the public as a
whole,'0 there has been no popular rejection of the death penalty."'
If one believes that juries are cross-sections of the community and
reflect current attitudes, then the increase in the number of defendants
sentenced to death warrants a conclusion opposite to that reached
by the Ralph court. The probable reason for the temporary cessation
of executions in the United States is the recent attack on the constitu-
tionality of the death penalty per se.32 To conclude that public
sentiment is against the death sentence for rape, the test suggested for
constitutionality, ignores the reason behind the cessation of execution.
The court also found the three-judge court's choice of the death
penalty in this case was anomalous when compared to the large num-
ber of rapists sentenced to prison. 3 It argued that the death sentence
27. The last execution in the United States took place June 3, 1967.
28. Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 792 (4th Cir. 1970).
29. In 1965, 298 prisoners were under sentence of death, United States Depart-
ment of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, National Prisoner Statistics No. 45, Capital Punish-
ment 1930-1968, at 12 (1969). This number increased to 479 in 1966; sixty of these
persons were under sentence of death for rape. Id. at 2. As of October 14, 1971,
654 prisoners were under sentence of death. Citizens Against Legalized Murder, Inc.
Newsletter, vol. V No. 2, (Nov. 1971).
30. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968):
[Olne of the most important functions any jury can perform . . . is to
maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal
system-a link without which the determination of punishment could hardly
reflect "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a ma-
turing society."
31. Cf. Brief by American Friends Service Committee et al. as amicus curiae at
6, Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,
521 n.19 (1968). But see Goldberg at 1784.
32. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in four cases which raise on appeal
the question whether the death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment prohibited
by the eighth amendment. Aikens v. California, 70 Cal. 2d 369, 450 P.2d 258, 74
Cal. Rptr. 882 (1969), cert. granted, 403 U.S. 952 (1971); Jackson v. Georgia, 225
Ga. 790, 171 S.E.2d 501 (1969), cert. granted, 403 U.S. 952 (1971); Furman v.
Georgia, 225 Ga. 253, 167 S.E.2d 628 (1969), cert. granted, 403 U.S. 952 (1971);
Branch v. Texas, 447 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969), cert. granted, 403 U.S. 952
(1971).
33. The court pointed out that in 1960, the year Ralph committed the rape, 15,560
rape cases were reported in the United States. Between 1960 and 1968, 190,790
Vol. 1972:170]
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was so anomalous as to be disproportionate in this case because, on
the record, the appellant's crime was not marked with the aggravating
circumstances which often accompany rape. 34  Varying penalties for
an offense do not by themselves, however, violate the eighth amend-
ment, because the eighth amendment does not require perfect equal-
ity in the punishment of crimes. "Undue leniency in one case does not
transfer a reasonable punishment in another case to a cruel one."35
Infrequency of imposition may mean the sentence is "unusual" but not
necessarily in the constitutional sense, 36 nor does it mean the sentence
is cruel, and the eighth amendment seems to require at least a finding
of cruelty before it will condemn a punishment.17
When a court decides to examine whether a particular punishment
rapes were reported. Compared to the number of reported cases the imposition of the
death penalty was rare. 1961, the year Ralph was convicted, saw only 21 convicted
rapists sentenced to death and the total 1960-68 period saw only 101 receive the sen-
tence. Only 28 convicted rapists were executed during this same period. Ralph v. War-
den, 438 F.2d 786, 792-3 (4th Cir. 1970). See also FBI, Uniform Crime Reports,
Crime in the United States (1970).
34. Evidence in the case indicates, contrary to the majority's finding, that the
victim's life was endangered.
Armed with a tire iron, Ralph broke into the victim's home late at night.
Threatening her and her young son, who was asleep in another room, with
death if she did not submit, he forcibly committed rape and sodomy. Ralph
v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 788 (4th Cir. 1970).
Is the majority of the court limiting the circumstances under which the death penalty
could be imposed to situations in which there is actual harm to the victim, or is the
decision limited to the actual circumstances of the crime involved? These questions are
left unanswered because of the failure of the majority to define the term "endangered".
As a result, the majority's holding may be extremely difficult to apply in future cases.
Without a definition of "endangered" the question appears to be the subjective judg-
ment of the appellate courts versus the subjective judgment of the trial court. See
Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 794-98 (4th Cir. 1970) (Boreman, J., dissenting
opinion); cf. Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HAnv. L REv. 1071,
1077 (1964).
35. Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126, 136 (1903), relied upon in Badders v.
United States, 240 U.S. 391, 394 (1916).
36. Whether the word "unusual" has any qualitative meaning different from
"cruel" is not clear. On the few occasions this court has had to consider the
meaning of the phrase, precise distinctions between cruelty and unusualness
do not seem to have been drawn. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 n.32
(1958).
37. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890); GoLDBEa at 1789-90. If
the death penalty is administered arbitrarily or discriminatorily the court might
find this a form of "unusual" punishment proscribed by the eighth amendment
without also requiring a showing of cruelty. Former Supreme Court Justice Gold-
berg has suggested this approach, GOLDBERG at 1790. This interpretation, however,
appears unnecessary as discriminatory administration would be prohibited by the equal
Washington University Open Scholarship
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is cruel and unusual, appropriate standards must be established. Many
courts have avoided the problem by applying no standard."8 Other
courts have looked to whether the "punishment contradicts prevailing
standards of decency," 39 or is "shocking to the sense of justice. '40
This approach forces courts to evaluate public sentiment regarding the
severity of the punishment. While according to recent public opinion
polls, the Ralph court may have been correct in determining the cur-
rent state of the public conscience,4 1 it reached this conclusion on less
than convincing empirical data. Objective indicia of societal attitudes
is lacking.42 The Ralph court realized this difficulty. All data relied
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Cf. Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138
(8th Cir. 1968), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 398 U.S. 262 (1970); Packer,
Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1071, 1082 (1964). The
problem remains the lack of statistics to prove discrimination. While strong proba-
bility of discrimination can be shown by statistics, there remain too many variables
for a court conclusively to decide there has been discrimination. See Ralph v.
Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 793 n.24 (4th Cir. 1970); Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d
138 (8th Cir. 1968). For examples showing the probability of a pattern of dis-
crimination, see United States Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, National Pris-
oner Statistic No. 45, Capital Punishment 1930-1968 at 10 (1969); Sellin, The Death
Penalty 7, in MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). The Ralph court was
unable to conclude from statistics showing a high correlation of race to death sentences
in rape cases that Ralph received the death penalty because he is black. Ralph v.
Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 793 n.24 (4th Cir. 1970).
38. See, e.g., Hedrick v. State, 357 F.2d 121 (10th Cir. 1966); Stephens v. State,
73 Okla. Crim. 349, 121 P.2d 326 (1942); Calhoun v. State, 85 Tex. Crim. 496,
214 S.W. 335 (1919).
39. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); cf. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 469 (1947). Both were cited by Mr. Justice Goldberg in his
dissent in Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 nn. 2 & 3 (1963).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 608 (2d Cir. 1952);
United States ex rel. Bongiorno v. Ragen, 54 F. Supp. 973, 981 (1944); Faulkner v.
State, 445 P.2d 815 (Alas. 1968); State v. Teague, 215 Ore. 609, 611, 336 P.2d
338, 339 (1959) (per curiam).
41. In Gallup poll conducted in 1969, 51% of those asked were in favor of re-
taining the death penalty for those convicted of murder. Forty percent were opposed
and 9% had no opinion. Gallup Opinion Index, Report No. 45, p. 15, 16 (March
1969). It is logical to conclude that fewer persons are in favor of the death penalty
for crimes other than murder. Cf. GOLDBERG at 1781 n.39 stating that a recent Gallup
poll showed less than 6% of those interviewed favored death as an appropriate penalty
for air-plane hijackers, bombers, and inciters of riots. Unless there is a historical
carryover of death as an appropriate penalty for rape the percent may be quite low.
But see Brief from respondent at 56, Aikens v. California, 403 U.S. 952 (1971) for a
poll showing 64.3% in favor of the death penalty for murder.
42. There has been extreme difficulty in ascertaining a national standard of de-
cency in obscenity cases. It would appear to be no less a problem with regard to
criminal punishments. See, e.g., Scuncio v. Columbus Theatre, Inc., 277 A.2d 924,
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on dealt with the death penalty for rape without distinguishing whether
the victim's life was taken or endangered. The court, on the basis
of that data, could just as reasonably have declared the death penalty
unconstitutional punishment for all rapes. It expressly refused to do
SO.4
3
927 (R.I. 1971); Court v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 683, 188 N.W.2d 475 (1971); Seaton,
Obscenity: The Search for a Standard, 13 U. KAN. L. REv. 117 (1964).
43. Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 793 (4th Cir. 1970).
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